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A persistent ethical issue in society is the gender compensation gap—the income 
inequality between men and women at the same organization performing equal work. The 
worldwide increase of women CEOs coupled with worldwide advocacy and interest for income 
and gender equality makes understanding the CEO gender compensation gap vital. The tendency 
of men and women to select different jobs leads to industry gender composition – the distribution 
of men and women workers within occupations. Very few studies that examined CEO 
compensation considered industry gender composition. The purpose of this study was to examine 
the influence of industry gender composition on CEO compensation. I gathered data from public 
United States firms between 2010 and 2018, from Compustat and Execucomp. The final sample 
consisted of 3,277 firm-year observations (182 women CEOs and 3,095 men CEOs). Results 
have implications for women interested in pursuing top-level positions as well as human resource 
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A persistent ethical issue in society is the gender compensation gap. This is the income 
inequality between men and women at the same organization performing equal work (Beal & 
Astakhova, 2017; Lips, 2013). Numerous scholars have researched the gender compensation gap 
between employees and found that women, on average, are compensated less than their male 
counterparts (Blau & Kahn, 2017; Kleinjans, Krassel, & Dukes, 2017). Compensation refers to 
the total payments, cash and non-cash, given to an employee. The majority of research on the 
gender compensation gap focuses on employees. It is only recently that researchers have begun 
studying the gender compensation gap among chief executive officers (CEOs). A CEO is the top 
executive of a company, responsible for the firm’s performance, operations, management, and 
decision making (Farkas & Wetlaufer, 2014).  
Research on the CEO gender compensation gap is limited compared to research on the 
employee gender compensation gap because in the past there were relatively few women CEOs, 
making it difficult for researchers to study the CEO gender compensation gap. However, as a 
result of socialization, the proportion of women CEOs is now increasing around the world 
(Gupta, Mortal, & Guo, 2018). In the United States, the percentage of women Fortune 500 CEOs 
increased from 0.2% in 1998 to 6.4% in 2017 (Donovan, 2015; Miller, 2018). The increase of 
women CEOs makes research on gender differences at the CEO level possible. This, coupled 
with worldwide advocacy and interest for income and gender equality, makes understanding the 
CEO gender compensation gap vital. CEO compensation is now considered a topic of 
international business research because it influences the decision-making strategies of CEOs from 
various institutional and cultural environments around the world (Buck, Liu, & Skovoroda, 
2008).  
Several studies have found a larger compensation gap between genders at the executive 
level, including CEOs and CFOs, compared to other positions (The Economist, 2017; Wang, 
Markóczy, Sun, & Peng, 2018). However, the findings for whether there is or is not a CEO 
compensation gap are mixed. Some papers found that there is a gap (Adams, Gupta, & Leeth, 
2010; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Elkinawy & Stater, 2011; Hill, Upadhyay, & Beekun, 2015; 
Mohan & Ruggiero, 2003; Mohan & Ruggiero, 2007; Wang et al., 2018) while others found there 
is no gap (Adams, Gupta, Haughton, & Leeth, 2007; Bugeja, Matolcsy, & Spiropoulos, 2012; 
Gupta et al., 2018) when it comes to the compensation of men and women CEOs. In addition to 
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mixed results, the impact of gender on CEO compensation is under-researched compared to other 
employment levels (Mohan, 2014). Furthermore, several papers that studied the impact of gender 
on CEO compensation did not solely measure CEO compensation but rather combined other top 
executives with CEOs in their analysis (Adams et al., 2010; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Elkinawy 
& Stater, 2011).  
The majority of research on CEO compensation is based on agency theory, but this theory 
does not provide guidance on gender compensation differences (Bugeja et al., 2012; Tosi, Katz, 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1997). Wang et al. (2018) use role congruity theory to analyze the CEO 
compensation gap. The role congruity theory posits that people who act in accordance with their 
gender and social role will be evaluated positively (Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Eagly & Karau, 
2002). However, Wang et al. (2018) analyzed Chinese publicly listed firms between 2004 and 
2010 (inclusively) and it is not clear whether or not the findings would generalize to a North 
American sample. Not only are there social and cultural differences but women CEOs are 
underrepresented more in the United States than in China (Wang et al., 2018). Thus, one of the 
goals of this paper is to analyze publicly traded United States firms while using role congruity 
theory to see if this theory can explain, and be extended to, CEO compensation research in the 
United States.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of industry gender composition on 
CEO compensation. Men and women tend to select different jobs, which leads to industry gender 
composition—that is, the distribution of men and women workers within occupations (Grund, 
2015). Previous literature on CEO compensation categorizes male-dominated industries as those 
with more than 50% male employees thus making men a large group of the stakeholders (Adams 
et al., 2010; Cumming, Leung, & Rui, 2015; Skalpe, 2007; Wang et al., 2018). The reverse is true 
for female-dominated industries. Some examples of female-dominated industries are social 
assistance, education, and health services (Cumming et al., 2015; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2017; Wang et al., 2018). In addition to the limited and mixed results of papers examining the 
impact of gender on CEO compensation, few considered industry gender composition. Thus, the 
question remains: how does industry gender composition influence CEO compensation?  
Industry gender composition must be considered when measuring gender gaps in 
compensation. Munoz–Bullon (2010) analyzed the gender gap of high-level executives’, 
including CEOs’, compensation of over 2,200 companies in the United States from 1992 to 2006 
 3 
and found that women earned approximately 50% less than men. However, after controlling for 
variables such as industry gender composition, this gap narrowed to 7% (Munoz–Bullon, 2010).  
Kleinjans et al. (2017) argued that industry gender composition affects the gender 
compensation gap because women often work in occupations that pay less than men. Despite 
having the same level of education, women and men gravitate towards different occupations. For 
example, women on average have a stronger preference for occupations that are targeted to help 
others and make a difference in the community (Kleinjans et al., 2017).  
In accordance with the role congruity theory, the more you are perceived as fitting your 
role (in this case the role of CEO) the better others perception of your performance and therefore 
the better your pay (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Since female-dominated industries value women 
characteristics more than male-dominated industries and have a larger proportion of women 
employees and thus fewer biases towards women, a woman CEO is more likely to be perceived 
as fitting the CEO role in a female- compared to a male-dominated industry. Thus, in a female-
dominated industry a woman CEO’s performance may be perceived more favourably and she will 
then be compensated more similarly to a man CEO. On the other hand, a woman CEO in a male-
dominated industry may not be perceived as fitting the role of CEO as well as a man and 
therefore will be perceived as worse performing and be compensated less.  
The low proportion of women CEOs coupled with a gender-based compensation gap 
could discourage women from aspiring, and applying, to these positions which could influence 
firm performance. For an organization to excel, every part of it must cooperate and work 
together. Leadership is one of the most important parts of an organization. Leaders can hinder or 
stimulate growth, cooperation, and change (Martin, 2015). Thus, it is generally agreed that top 
leaders can be critical to the organization’s success.  
Despite the pressure and importance of hiring a good leader, companies are less likely to 
promote or hire women leaders. There is a higher proportion of men in leadership roles, even in 
professions dominated by women (Cabrera, Sauer, & Thomas-Hunt, 2009). Women must work 
harder and be more qualified than their male counterparts to even be considered for leadership 
positions (Eagly, 2007). This is partly because society’s perception of leaders is largely 
masculine. On average, people rate men more favorably as leaders than women and perceive men 
as having more leadership potential (Cabrera et al., 2009). Gender stereotypes about 
characteristics often associated with men and women contribute to this perception. Women, for 
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example, are often associated with being more understanding, cooperative, nurturing, and 
empathetic. On the other hand, men are associated with being more independent, analytical, and 
assertive (Christov-Moore et al., 2014; Paustian-Underdahl, Walker, & Woehr, 2014). Gender 
stereotypes also contribute to the gender stereotyping of occupations. That is, men and women 
gravitate to occupations that are more consistent with the characteristics associated with their 
gender thus conforming to the stereotype (Stoker, Van der Velde, & Lammers, 2011). However, 
according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017), most of the highest paying jobs are male-
dominated, and women make less money than men weekly at these jobs.   
Society more generally, and board of directors specifically, should be aware of possible 
gender biases, because in large public companies, the board of directors’ recommendations 
usually determine CEO pay (Nobel, 2015; Schoen, 2006). Determining the effects of industry 
gender composition on CEO compensation will not only be filling an important gap in the 
existing literature, but it will also further our understanding of the gender compensation gap and 
how to prevent it. From a practical perspective, this research has implications for women 
interested in pursuing CEO positions as well as human resource departments, particularly with 
regards to succession planning. It could also prepare women CEOs for negotiations about their 
pay and inform human resources of possible pay discrepancies and biases (Ren & Zhu, 2010). 
Furthermore, gender discrimination at the CEO level may hinder women’s access to these 
positions and discourage them from aspiring to these promotions (Shin, 2012). As a result, 
organizations may be missing out on competent women leaders.  
In addition, if only men are being compensated appropriately, it discourages women 
candidates from applying to these positions. Pay equity not only broadens the applicant pool but 
it can also reduce the time and cost of recruiting qualified individuals (Chicha, 2006). Companies 
want to attract the best candidates. Thus, the compensation gap is counterproductive and limits 
the applicant pool.  
 Morally, as a society, we should care if there is a CEO gender compensation gap. The 
United States Equal Pay Act of 1963 states that women and men workers employed in the same 
organization, performing equal work, have the right to equal pay (Blau & Kahn, 2017). However, 
firms only have one CEO at a time, so it is not as easy to compare men and women CEOs as it is 
to compare men and women employees to determine if they are receiving equal compensation. 
For this reason, the United States Equal Pay Act of 1963 does not directly apply to CEOs. 
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Although gender-based compensation differences between CEOs are not illegal, it remains unfair 
and equal work should be equal pay.   
Theoretical Development 
Role Congruity Theory  
Role congruity theory revolves around the perceived congruity between gender and social 
roles (Eagly & Karau, 2002), in this case, leadership roles. Social roles refer to socially shared 
expectations towards people of a certain social category or in a particular social position whereas 
gender roles are established beliefs about the characteristics, behaviors, and attributes of men and 
women (Eagly & Chrvala, 1986; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). Women and men are taught to socialize 
and act according to the expectations attached to their gender roles (Elsesser & Lever, 2011). For 
example, society often frowns upon men for being overly emotional and talkative because these 
qualities are associated with women. In contrast, society frowns upon women for being overly 
dominant, competitive, and aggressive because these qualities are associated with men. Gender 
roles are more than just beliefs, they are normative expectations that entail the desirable qualities 
expected of men and women (Eagly & Karau, 2002). An example of this is the socially shared 
expectation that women are more sympathetic, caring, communal, gentler, and helpful than men. 
Thus, women are often perceived as less risk-taking, competitive, and aggressive. Men, in 
contrast, are associated with being more dominant, confident, controlling, ambitious, and forceful 
(Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Ho, Li, Tam, & Zhang, 2015; Oakley, 2000; Wang et al., 2018). 
These differences are what influences people’s fit perception of men and women in leadership 
roles (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Gender roles also contribute to gender stereotyping of occupations. 
That is, men and women gravitate to occupations that are more consistent with the characteristics 
associated with their gender thus conforming to the stereotype (Stoker, Van der Velde, & 
Lammers, 2011).  
According to Eagly and Karau (2002), the perceived relationship between characteristics 
of social group members and social role requirements of said group members is how prejudices 
arise. Prejudices exist when individuals believe stereotypes about a social group that contradict 
the characteristics required to be successful within certain classes of social roles. The 
inconsistency that arises when a person connects an incongruent social role and stereotyped 
group member lowers the group member’s evaluation as a potential or actual social role 
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occupant. Many people perceive an incongruity between leader role requirements and women 
characteristics which leads to prejudices towards women leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002). 
Persuasive stereotypes that men “take charge” while women “take care” are resilient 
(Heilman, 2001; Hoyt, 2010; Hoyt, Johnson, Murphy, & Skinnell, 2010). Leaders are often 
perceived as influential and dominant, which are characteristics often associated with men. Most 
leader stereotypes are masculine. For example, one stereotype is that leaders are assertive, 
competitive, and aggressive (Lee & James, 2007; Wang et al., 2018). Meanwhile, women are 
associated with being more community-oriented and nurturing which contradicts leadership 
stereotypes. This contradiction further influences people’s perceptions of women leaders (Eagly 
& Karau, 2002; Elsesser & Lever, 2011).  
Eagly, Karau, and Makhijani (1995) conducted a meta-analysis and found that men and 
women are overall equally effective leaders but are more effective leaders in gender congruent 
roles. Specifically, women are more effective leaders in female-dominated industries in roles that 
are less-masculine such as social services, education, and governmental organizations than men. 
In contrast, men are more effective leaders and women are less effective leaders in male-
dominated industries (Eagly et al., 1995). Multiple studies since then have also found that people 
find leaders more effective when they fit the position and society’s gender-based expectations of 
them (Ostroff & Atwater, 2003; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2014). Particularly, Eagly and Carli 
(2003) found that women’s leadership style is more cooperative and less direct than men. They 
also found that women’s leadership style works best in groups of mostly women subordinates and 
in positions that require cooperation, that is, in female-dominated industries. In contrast, people 
perceive men as better leaders when the position involves direction and control (Eagly & Carli, 
2003), which are typical in male-dominated industries.  
Employees’ responses to the leader are crucial for effective leadership. If the leader does 
not fit the employees’ perception of a leader, they are less likely to respect, follow, and accept 
him/her, thus reducing the leader’s effectiveness (Hoyt, 2010). Women leaders’ performance 
evaluations are reduced in male-dominated industries (Adams et al., 2010; Ostroff & Atwater, 
2003; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2014) even if a woman has an authoritarian leadership style that 
is more masculine and in line with male-dominated industries. Studies have found that women 
who adopt a more masculine leadership style are penalized by receiving less favorable 
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evaluations and being less liked because it contradicts their gender role (Elsesser & Lever, 2011; 
Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Johnson, Murphy, Zewdie, & Reichard, 2008).  
Irrespective of the fact that male-dominated industries may have more difficulty accepting 
women leaders, people in general have difficulty perceiving women as leaders because there are 
more negative gender biases associated with women than men (Koch, D’Mello, & Sackett, 2015; 
Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011). Regarding CEOs, society is used to seeing a man 
CEO and the phenomenon of women CEOs is still relatively new. The overproportion of men to 
women CEOs is drastic. Thus, the social role of a CEO is often associated with the gender role of 
a man. This is also partly why women are perceived as being more effective as mid-level leaders 
than upper-level leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2014). Women must 
also work harder and be more qualified than their male counterparts to even be considered for 
leadership positions, let alone the CEO position (Eagly, 2007). Despite this effort and hard work, 
people on average rate men more favorably as leaders than women and on average perceive men 
as having more leadership potential (Cabrera, Sauer, & Thomas-Hunt, 2009). Regardless of the 
industry gender composition, men do not have as hard of a time getting promoted to CEO as 
women.  
In addition to the difficulty women face being promoted to leadership positions, they are 
subject to stereotypes and scrutinized when promoted to CEO. The stereotypes associated with 
leadership and women may influence women’s performance evaluation, therefore influencing 
their compensation (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Lyness & Heilman, 2006). Due to the 
infrequency and lack of women CEOs, they face more criticism and skepticism than men CEOs 
(Abdullah, Ismail, & Nachum, 2016; Gao, Lin, & Ma, 2016; Hoobler, Masterson, Nkomo, & 
Michel, 2018). Gender-based expectations of women and their social role increase the scrutiny 
that women CEOs experience, further discounting their expertise and experience (Eagly, 
Johannesen-Schmidt, & Van Engen, 2003; Ryan & Haslam, 2007). In general, women CEOs are 
appreciated less than men which could influence their compensation (Eagly & Carli, 2012; Lanaj 
& Hollenbeck, 2015, Wang et al., 2018). The criticisms and prejudices women CEOs face seem 
to be worsened in male-dominated industries, where there is a disproportion of men to women 
employees.  
 Since most leader stereotypes are masculine, women CEOs may display behaviors that 
are not in accordance with their gender stereotype. According to role congruity theory, this may 
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negatively affect women’s compensation. More specifically, women CEOs contradict gender and 
leader stereotypes, women will not be perceived as fitting the CEO role which could reduce 
people’s perceptions of their performance and therefore their compensation. However, having 
women CEOs manage successful companies thus showing that masculine traits are not necessary 
to be a good leader may work in favor of women and in abolishing these stereotypes. In addition, 
successful women CEOs leading companies can change society’s perception of fit between 
women and leadership roles (Appelbaum, Audet, & Miller, 2003; Oakley, 2000; Wessel, 
Hagiwara, Ryan, & Kermond, 2015). Furthermore, since the majority of employees in female-
dominated industries are women, the contributions of women are emphasized. Therefore, having 
a woman CEO could provide useful insights into the workforce and improve internal 
coordination which may lead to strategic improvements towards employees, customers, and 
trading partners (Cumming et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2018). The unique perspective of women 
CEOs may also enable them to analyze strategic options more thoroughly and improving decision 
quality (Hill et al., 2015; Koenig et al., 2011). Women CEOs may bring useful insights to female-
dominated industries, which may improve the contextual alignment of women CEOs. Being a 
woman rather than a man offers different perceptual views and solutions. Since the majority of 
firms have men CEOs, having a woman CEO may certainly bring a new managerial perspective 
(Perryman, Fernando, & Tripathy, 2016). 
Furthermore, the traits admired and expected in leaders may vary depending on the 
context, particularly whether the industry is female- or male-dominated (Eagly & Karau, 2002; 
Hoobler et al., 2018; Lee & James, 2007). Female-dominated industries, for example, often 
appreciate and put more emphasis on community and communication (Koenig et al., 2011; Wang 
et al., 2018). Thus, these industries may be more aligned with gender stereotypes associated with 
women, which could reduce the role incongruity women CEOs face in male-dominated industries 
(Rosette & Tost, 2010). Women’s leadership styles may be perceived as fitting better in female-
dominated industries where women’s characteristics are more aligned with the company (Adams 
et al., 2010). Therefore, women CEOs in female-dominated industries may experience 
performance evaluations that are more reflective of their expertise which could lead to their 
compensation being more congruent to that of a man CEO. As mentioned above, society is used 
to seeing men CEOs which is why they do not face the same skepticism and criticism that women 
CEOs face. However, because of the value women CEOs bring to female-dominated industries, 
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the reduced role incongruity, gender biases, and likelihood that their performance evaluations 
will be more reflective of their expertise, women CEOs may be compensated more similarly to 
men CEOs in female-dominated industries.  
Women leaders are less accepted in male-dominated industries and their performance 
evaluations tend to be reduced in male-dominated industries (Adams et al., 2010; Ostroff & 
Atwater, 2003; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2014). Moreover, the perceived fit between the social 
and gender roles of a woman CEO is reduced in a male-dominated industry. As previously 
discussed, if the leader does not fit employees’ “leader image”, they are less likely to respect, 
follow, and accept him/her, thus reducing the leader’s perceived effectiveness, which may then 
reduce their compensation because performance perceptions influence compensation (Hoyt, 
2010). Since the majority of employees in male-dominated industries are men, the social and 
gender roles of women CEOs may be incongruent and may not fit employees’ perceptions as 
much as men CEOs.  
Hypothesis. Female-dominated industries have less of a CEO compensation gap 
 compared to male-dominated industries. 
Method 
Overview 
From a methodological perspective, studying CEOs has many advantages. First, every 
company in the United States that is publicly traded must disclose their CEO’s yearly salary, 
bonuses, pension, and stock benefits (Wharton Research Data Services, 2015). As well, many 
CEOs’ career and personal history are publicly available. Second, one of the biggest drawbacks 
of analyzing the gender compensation gap is trying to isolate the effect of gender. However, 
CEOs are a relatively homogenous group therefore differences between men and women can 
largely be attributed to gender (Shin, 2012).  
This study analyzed data from public United States firms between 2010 and 2018, 
inclusively. The data for this study were collected from the Compustat and Execucomp databases. 
These databases are reputable and widely sourced in academic journals (Elsaid, 2015; Jalbert, 
Jalbert, & Furumo, 2013; Vähämaa, 2017; Vieito, 2012). They have been widely used for 
multiple research projects, including leading business and compensation research (Ozkan, 2009). 
Execucomp includes executive compensation data extracted from each company’s annual proxy 
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(DEF14A SEC form). This includes time series data for over 3,462 organizations, since 1992, of 
detailed information on CEO pensions, stock options, salaries, bonuses, and other compensation 
items (Wharton Research Data Services, 2015). Compustat provides thousands of annual income 
statements, pensions, balance sheets, descriptive, and cash flow data for over 84,000 companies 
(Wharton Research Data Services, n.d.). All the data collected is in 1992 constant United States 
dollars.  
The data from Compustat and Execucomp were merged using the global company key 
(GVKEY) and the year (Gupta et al., 2018). Every company is assigned a GVKEY which is a 
unique number used to identify companies in Execucomp and Compustat (Stanford Graduate 
School of Business, n.d.). CEOs whose tenures were less than one fiscal year were removed from 
the sample as were CEOs whose total compensation was blank. Control variables were modelled 
after Mangen’s (2017) research on CEO performance evaluations. After each calculation for the 
control variables was complete using either SAS or SPSS, a spot check of twenty at random were 
manually calculated to verify that every calculation for the control variables was correct. Z-scores 
of +/- 3.29 standard deviations were considered outliers and removed from the sample. On this 
basis, nine observations were deleted. The final sample consisted of 3,277 firm-year observations 
(182 women CEOs, 3,095 men CEOs) between 2010 and 2018.  
Measures 
Independent Variables  
Gender. CEO gender was presented under ‘gender’ as either man or woman in the 
Execucomp database and was an indicator variable coded as 1 for women and 0 for men.  
Industry gender composition. This was determined by first looking at the ‘NAICS code’ 
and ‘Description of NAICS Code’ in Execucomp. These were then matched to the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2017) labor force statistics from the 2017 survey, which was organized by 
NAICS description and code, to determine the gender composition of the industry (Ko, Kotrba, & 
Roebuck, 2015). If an industry had more than 50% women employees, it was categorized as 
“female-dominated”. The reverse was true for male-dominated industries (Wang et al., 2018). 
Industry gender composition was an indicator variable coded as 1 for female-dominated and 0 for 
male-dominated. If the ‘Description of NAICS Code’ did not match verbatim with the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017) labor force statistics, a cross-reference guide for NAICS codes 
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was consulted. The cross-reference guide provided similar classifications and codes for similar 
industries that might apply to the NAICS code in question (NAICS Association, n.d.; Smith, 
n.d.). If a NAICS code could not be matched to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017) labor 
force statistics, the observations were removed from the data. Secondary market financing, 
conglomerate, photography studios portrait, and unclassified establishments were removed from 
the data because they could not be matched. Gasoline stations were also removed from the data 
because it consisted of 50% women and 50% men employees (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2017). 
Dependent Variable  
CEO compensation is the dependent variable. In Execucomp, total annual compensation 
is listed as ‘TDC1’ which is recorded in units of $1000 (Wharton Research Data Services, 2015). 
This includes the total value of stocks, bonuses, incentive payouts, benefits, salary, and all other 
compensation. The natural log of this variable was used as the dependent variable, per the 
suggestions of specification tests and the economic theory (Adams et al., 2007; Gupta et al., 
2018; Heckman & Polachek, 1974).  
Individual (Within-Firm) Control Variables 
Individual CEO characteristics that influence compensation were controlled.  
CEO Tenure. The first individual control variable was CEO tenure. This was controlled 
because CEOs with less tenure may not have as much influence over the board of directors as 
CEOs with longer tenure. Since CEOs with longer tenures have known their board of directors 
for longer they typically have stronger relationships with them which could influence their 
compensation (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). Execucomp displayed CEO tenure as ‘date became 
CEO’ and ‘date left as CEO’. The years between these two dates were calculated to compute 
CEO tenure.  
CEO Chairman. The second individual control variable was CEO chairman, which was 
an indicator variable coded as 1 when the CEO is the chairman or vice-chairman and 0 if not. 
Execucomp displays CEO chairman as ‘chairman’ under ‘TITLEANN’ (WRDS, 2015). This 
needed to be controlled because CEOs who act as the board chairperson tend to receive higher 
compensations due to their greater influence over the board (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Bugeja et 
al., 2012; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Walker, 2002). 
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Organizational-Level (Between-Firm) Control Variables 
Several economic characteristics that influence compensation were also controlled.  
Sales. The first economic control variable was sales, represented as net sales. The item 
‘SALE’ in Compustat represents gross sales minus allowances to customers, returned sales, and 
cash and trade discounts (WRDS, 2015). The natural logarithm of ‘SALE’ at the end of t – 1 was 
calculated to create the variable sales (Mangen, 2017).  
Firm Risk. The second economic control variable was volatility also known as firm risk. 
This was calculated by computing the standard deviation of annual stock returns for five years 
before t (Gupta et al., 2018; Mangen, 2017). The item ‘PRCC_F’ in Compustat displays annual 
fiscal price close (WRDS, 2015). For this variable, [(PRCC_F in current year - PRCC_F in 
previous year) / PRCC_F in previous year] was calculated then the standard deviation over five 
years was calculated.  
Growth Options. The third economic control variable was the book-to-market ratio, also 
known as growth options. This was calculated by computing the natural logarithm of 
[AT/(MKVALT-CEQ+AT)] at t – 1. The item ‘AT’ in Compustat represents total 
assets/liabilities. Total market value is represented by ‘MKVALT’ in Compustat. Lastly, 
common/ordinary equity total ‘CEQ’ in Compustat represents common shareholders’ interest in 
the company (WRDS, 2015).  
Firm Size. The fourth economic control variable was firm size which needed to be 
controlled for because smaller firm CEOs often receive less compensation than CEOs of larger 
firms. The reason larger firm CEOs are compensated more is that they usually have more 
demands and responsibilities (Smith & Watts, 1992). The natural logarithm of ‘AT’ at t – 1 was 
calculated for the firm size control variable (Hill et al., 2015; Lee, 2004).  
Stock Return. The fifth firm control variable was stock return. The variable ‘TRT1M’ in 
Compustat represents the total monthly return of a firm (WRDS, 2015). Twelve monthly 
observations of ‘TRT1M’ were totaled to calculate a firm’s returns of one year.  
Year. The final control variable was the year of the total compensation value.  
Test of Hypothesis  
 Since the dependent variable is a continuous variable and the two independent variables 
are dichotomous, ANOVA (or ANCOVA, with control variables) would appear appropriate. 
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However, ANOVA assumes the independence of the error terms, which is not the case with the 
current dataset because the error terms are likely correlated within firms. In other words, the 
variables are at different levels: total compensation is measured within firms and may vary each 
year, as does gender of the CEO, whereas industry composition is a between-firm variable that 
does not vary within firms. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) is recommended when testing 
cross-level relationships within- and between-firms (Hofmann, 1997; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; 
Woltman, Feldstain, MacKay, & Rocchi, 2012). HLM clusters the data while ANOVA does not. 
HLM results will be presented as recommended by Gupta et al. (2018) who highlighted the 
importance of clustering data.  
Results 
Overview 
First, descriptive statistics are reported. Next, correlation results are discussed. This is 
followed by the reporting and discussion of HLM results which was calculated using HLM 8 
software (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2019).  
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 shows total compensation means and standard deviations broken down by gender 
and industry composition. Table 2 presents overall descriptive statistics and intercorrelations 
among all variables of interest. The sample included 3095 men CEO and 182 women CEO firm-
year observations. Industry-wise the sample consisted of 2737 firm-year male-dominated 
industries and 540 firm-year female-dominated industries.  
Correlations  
Table 2 presents the correlations among variables. Gender was not significantly related to 
total compensation (r(3275) = -.02, p = 0.270) but industry composition was significantly related 
to total compensation (r(3275) = .07, p = 0.000). Every control variable was statistically related 
to total compensation at the 0.01 level (see Table 2). This suggests that gender did not influence 
CEO compensation whereas industry composition and other firm-level and individual-level 
factors influenced the amount CEOs earned.  
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Hierarchical Linear Modeling   
Table 3 presents the HLM results. The hypothesis stipulated that female-dominated 
industries have less of a CEO compensation gap compared to male-dominated industries. In this 
hypothesis, a within-firm variable (CEO total compensation) is predicted by a between-firm 
variable (industry composition). Before any cross-level effects could be examined, significant 
between-firm variance in the dependent variable (total compensation) must be established. Thus, 
a null model including only the dependent variable and no predictors for total compensation was 
necessary to demonstrate a meaningful between-firm variance (Singer & Willett, 2003). This is 
represented by the following equation: 
 
Total compensationti = β00 + r0i + eti                                            (1) 
 
Total compensationti is the individual-level outcome, β00 is the intercept, r0i is the residual 
variance at level-2, and eti is the level-1 error term. The within-firm variance component was .16, 
while the between-firm variance component was .68 (2(447) = 13366.68, p < .001). Thus, 
80.71% of the total variance was between firms. This was calculated by dividing the between-
variance component by the total variance (between-firm variance plus within-firm variance). 
Taken together, this means that 80.71% of total compensation varies systematically between 
firms. The significant effect justified the examination of firm-level effects for total compensation. 
The test of the hypothesis was conducted using the following equation, where r5i is the residual 
variance in gender slope:   
 
Total compensationti = β00 + β01 (Industry compositioni) + β10 (Yearti)  
+ β20 (Stock returnti) + β30 (CEO chairmanti) + β40 (Tenureti) + β50 (Genderti) 
+ β51 (Industry compositioni)(Genderti) + β60 (Firm riskti) + β70 (Growth optionsti)  
+ β80 (Firm sizeti) + β90 (Salesti) + r0i + r5i (Genderti) + eti                                                         (2) 
 
Robust standard errors were used in the analysis. All the variables were within-firm (level-1) 
predictors except industry composition which was a between-firm (level-2) predictor. All 
predictors were specified as fixed effects, except for gender, which was random (its effect was 
allowed to vary across firms). GVKEY was used to link level-1 and level-2 predictors.  
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Results showed that the interaction between the effects of gender and industry 
composition on total compensation was not statistically significant at the p<.05 level (t(439) = 
0.56, p = .577). Gender did not have a significant effect on total compensation at the p<.05 level 
(t(439) = -0.64, p = .525) and neither did industry gender composition (t(439) = -1.11, p = .269). 
These results suggest that CEOs’ total compensation is not influenced by gender or whether the 
industry is male- or female-dominated. Rather, what was significant was the effects that year 
(t(2284) = 3.02, p = .003), CEO chairman (t(2284) = 2.03, p = .043), firm risk (t(2284) = -4.39, p 
< .001), growth options (t(2284) = -8.31, p < .001), firm size (t(2284) = 23.46, p < .001), and 
sales (t(2284) = 2.07, p = .038) had at the p<.05 level on CEOs total compensation. Altogether, 
the results suggest that CEO total compensation has little to do with the CEO’s gender and the 
industry gender composition and is instead influenced by the CEO and company’s performance, 
specifically growth options, firm size, risk, sales, and whether the CEO is also the chairman.  
After including all of the predictors, the remaining within-firm variance was .15, while 
the between-firm variance component was .19 (2(25) = 105.18, p < .001). The total percent of 
the variance between firms accounted for by all predictor variables is calculated by subtracting 
the null between-firm variance component (presented in the previous model) by the remaining 
between-firm variance; this total is then divided by the null between-firm variance component. 
Based on these calculations, 71.95% of the total percentage of the variance in total CEO 
compensation between firms was accounted for by all predictor variables.  
Discussion 
I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between men and women CEOs 
compensations and do not find that industry composition and gender influence CEO 
compensation. Specifically, the compensation of men and women CEOs is not influenced by 
their gender or whether the industry is female- or male-dominated but rather is influenced by the 
firm’s risk, size, sales, growth options, and whether the CEO is also the chairman. Furthermore, 
year also influences CEO compensation, with compensation typically increasing every year.  
Contrary to some research results suggesting that CEO gender influences compensation 
(Adams et al., 2010; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Elkinawy & Stater, 2011; Hill et al., 2015; 
Mohan & Ruggiero, 2003; Mohan & Ruggiero, 2007; Wang et al., 2018), the present study 
contributes to recent research which finds that CEO gender does not influence compensation 
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(Adams et al., 2007; Bugeja et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2018; Leszczynska & Chandon, 2019). The 
studies that find there is a CEO gender compensation gap have smaller samples, methodologies 
that are less rigorous, and they do not analyze CEO compensation separately from executive 
compensation. For example, Adams et al. (2010), Bertrand and Hallock (2001), and Elkinawy 
and Stater (2011) include executives in their analyses and do not measure the gap with only 
CEOs. Mohan and Ruggiero’s (2003) sample includes 47 women CEOs from publicly traded 
companies with matched pairs of comparable men CEOs. Similarly, Mohan and Ruggiero’s 
(2007) sample includes 40 companies with a matched sample of men to women CEOs. Wang et 
al.’ (2018) sample was composed of Chinese executives, which might not be comparable to the 
United States. Lastly, Hill et al.’s (2015) sample is from 1996-2005. However, the studies that do 
not find a CEO gender compensation gap analyze CEO compensation separately from executive 
compensation, have larger and more recent samples, more rigorous methods, and their analyses 
extend further in time. Using a matched sample of men to women CEOs, Leszczynska and 
Chandon (2019) analyze 54 women CEOs in the United States 2014 Fortune’s 1000 report. This 
is a slightly larger and more recent sample compared to Mohan and Ruggiero (2003) and Mohan 
and Ruggiero (2007) who also use a matched comparison of men and women CEOs. In 
comparison to Hill et al. (2015), Adams et al.’s (2007) sample include 1992-2008 and Bugeja et 
al.’s (2012) sample is from 1998-2010. Thus, Adams et al.’s (2007) and Bugeja et al.’s (2012) 
samples are larger, more recent, and extend further in time. Lastly, Gupta et al. (2018) replicate 
and extend Hill et al. (2015) by analyzing CEOs from 1996-2014 with more rigorous methods. 
The results of this study are aligned with the findings of the aforementioned rigorous studies that 
also find there is no CEO gender compensation gap. 
Of the above studies that do not find a CEO gender compensation gap, none refer to or 
use a theory in their hypothesis development or discussion. As previously mentioned, one of the 
goals of this paper is to extend and apply the role congruity theory to CEO compensation 
research. Men and women are socialized, and behave, differently, which influences people’s 
perceptions of gender roles (Wang et al., 2018; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). This paper focuses 
on gender perceptions and gender roles and its influence on CEO compensation in an attempt to 
extend the findings of Wang et al. (2018) to the United States and using role congruity theory. 
Although the compensation of men and women CEOs is not influenced by their gender or 
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whether the industry is female- or male-dominated, as originally hypothesized, it is possible that 
the interpretation of role congruity theory in hypothesis development could be done differently.   
In the hypothesis development section, it was explained that people, in general, have 
difficulty perceiving women as leaders because there are more negative gender biases associated 
with women than men (Koch et al., 2015; Koenig et al., 2011). Many people perceive an 
incongruity between women’s characteristics and leader role requirements because women are 
often associated with being more community-oriented and nurturing, which contradicts 
leadership stereotypes. This contradiction influences people’s perceptions and prejudices towards 
women leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Elsesser & Lever, 2011). On average, people rate men 
more favorably as leaders than women and they perceive men as having more leadership 
potential (Cabrera et al., 2009). Some studies suggest that the leader role violates the 
characteristics of being supportive and nurturing often associated with women thus making it 
unlikely that they will be compensated similarly to men who better fit the role (Adams et al., 
2007; Dennis & Kunkel, 2004; Eagly et al., 1992; Eagly et al., 1995; Eagly & Karau, 2002; 
Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2014). Studies have also found that both genders are overall equally 
effective leaders but are more effective when they fit the position and society’s gender-based 
expectations of them (Eagly et al., 1995; Ostroff & Atwater, 2003; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 
2014). However, gender stereotypes have changed. A recent meta-analysis of United States 
opinion polls on gender stereotypes from 1946 to 2018 found that perceived gender equality in 
competence increased over time and men’s advantage in agency (i.e. courageous, ambitious) over 
women decreased (Eagly, Nater, Miller, Kaufmann, & Sczesny, 2020). Additionally, CEOs are a 
relatively homogenous group of highly skilled and accomplished individuals, therefore 
differences between men and women can largely be attributed to gender (Shin, 2012). As such, 
perhaps research on leaders cannot be extended readily to CEOs. There are different levels of 
organizational management, each with its own leader, but there is usually only one CEO and 
she/he is the top executive (Farkas & Wetlaufer, 2014). It is possible that research on leader 
perceptions and stereotypes do not apply the same way to CEOs or that gender stereotypes in 
general are changing and that is why gender does not influence CEO compensation.  
It could be that once women make it to the highest level of a company, CEO, they do not 
face the same discrimination as other women leaders. Regardless of gender, the CEO position is 
extremely hard to get and holds a lot of power. It could be that people’s perceived fit between the 
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gender and social role of being a leader is different for CEOs. This may be especially true since 
women must work harder and be more qualified than their male counterparts to even be 
considered for the CEO position (Eagly, 2007). The prestige, education, and authority associated 
with the CEO role may supersede gender stereotypes of women being community-oriented and 
nurturing. Thus, the people who do become CEOs are seen as being aligned with the role 
regardless of their gender or the industry.  
The argument that the social role of CEO is often associated with the male gender role 
because society is used to seeing men CEOs and the phenomenon of women CEOs is still 
relatively new, was also discussed in hypothesis development. This was associated with increased 
skepticism and criticism women CEOs face due to their scarcity compared to men CEOs 
(Abdullah et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2016; Hoobler et al., 2018). However, this also gets women 
CEOs special media attention in addition to the media coverage CEOs normally get (Hill et al., 
2015).  
Following the Hill et al. proposition, (2015), a possible explanation for the compensation 
parity between men and women CEOs may be the visibility of the position. Information about 
CEOs of publicly-traded United States firms is easily accessible to the public, including CEO 
compensation. There are laws in place that require public United States companies to disclose the 
compensation of their CEOs in a comprehensive and understandable manner (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2011). Since the compensation of CEOs is more visible than other 
positions, companies may be more aware of possible ramifications from stakeholders and the 
public if they compensated their CEOs inequitably. CEOs of large publicly traded firms also 
receive more media coverage than CEOs of smaller or private firms (Dixon‐Fowler, Ellstrand, & 
Johnson, 2013; Hill et al., 2015; Lee & James, 2007). This could influence their desire to be 
viewed at the forefront of social movements such as gender equality (Hill et al., 2015; King, 
2008; McDonnell & King, 2013). The small number of women compared to men in leadership 
positions, particularly in the CEO position, has become an ethical issue. Thus, how women are 
compensated has ethical connotations and is under scrutiny (Gao et al., 2016; Oakley, 2000; 
Wang et al., 2018).  
Although there is still a larger proportion of men to women CEOs, it is possible that 
having women CEOs manage successful companies may have lessened the stereotype that 
masculine traits are needed to be a good leader. As previously stated in hypothesis development, 
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having successful women CEOs lead companies can change society’s perception of the fit of 
women in leadership roles (Appelbaum et al., 2003; Oakley, 2000; Wessel et al., 2015). Perhaps 
this has already happened, especially since researchers have argued that having a woman CEO 
provides workforce insights and can improve internal coordination which can lead to strategic 
improvements among trading partners, employees, and customers (Cumming et al., 2015; Wang 
et al., 2018). Women CEOs may bring useful insights to industries, different from what men 
CEOs could bring, further improving the contextual alignment of women CEOs. Being a woman 
offers different perceptual solutions and views. Women CEOs may improve decision quality 
because their unique perspective may enable them to analyze strategic options more thoroughly 
(Hill et al., 2015; Koenig et al., 2011). Lastly, having a woman CEO may provide a competitive 
advantage and bring a new managerial perspective since the majority of firms have men CEOs 
(Perryman et al., 2016). 
Compensation is often seen as a measure of one’s worth and value to a company (Adams 
et al., 2007). Large public United States companies are compensating CEOs for their 
inimitability, value, and rarity (Hill et al., 2015). However, discrimination and systematic biases 
in promoting and hiring women CEOs may be present as there are very few women compared to 
men CEOs (Hill et al., 2015). Thus, one should be cautious when interpreting these findings to 
mean that women CEOs do not face discrimination. This finding shows that gender 
discrimination towards pay may have been overcome in the United States, at least for CEOs in 
large public firms. This study contributes to the literature on CEO compensation and ascertains 
that women CEOs do not appear to be discriminated against in terms of compensation as gender 
did not influence their compensation (Hill et al., 2015). Interestingly, whether the industry was 
male- or female-dominated also did not influence CEO compensation. Thus, gender in any sense 
does not seem to influence CEO compensation. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 This research has some limitations that should be acknowledged and taken into 
consideration for future research. First, the stock return control variable is not adjusted for market 
returns because this information is unavailable on Compustat. A more proximate measure of 
stock return would strengthen the results.  
Second, the data were collected from a single country, the United States, compromising 
generalizability. The data were collected from United States firms and not Canadian firms 
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because publicly traded Canadian companies, unlike the United States, are not required to 
disclose publicly their CEOs’ compensation (Cook, Ingersoll, & Glass, 2019; Tuzyk & Childs, 
2019). The generalizability of these findings for men and women CEOs in less egalitarian 
societies that are more or less encouraging towards women in business can not be assumed and 
requires further investigation (Adams et al., 2010; Gupta et al., 2018). Future researchers could 
extend these findings by examining the compensation of men and women in female- and male-
dominated industries in other executive roles and other societies.  
Third, the data did not include privately held companies or non-profit organizations, 
further limiting generalizability. Although firm size was controlled, extending these analyses to 
smaller and private companies would be a promising focus for future researchers to pursue and 
could add insights to compensation theories. Future researchers could investigate the cultural and 
management characteristics of other countries and smaller companies to further understand 
variations in CEO compensation (Leszczynska & Chandon, 2019).  
Although industry gender composition does not influence CEO compensation, 
understanding industry differences in promoting women would be an interesting avenue for 
future researchers to pursue (Adams et al., 2007). Future researchers could analyze why some 
companies, over others, promote women to CEO positions and whether the demographic 
composition of the board of director is correlated with the promotion of women CEOs (Bertrand 
& Hallock, 2001). Another avenue for future studies is to analyze whether the promotion of 
women to CEO positions impacts gender pay discrepancies throughout companies. For example, 
does having a woman CEO improve pay equality between genders throughout the company? Do 
companies with women CEOs have more equitable pay and less of a gender compensation gap 
throughout the company? This will further extend our knowledge of the gender pay gap. 
Although beyond the scope of the current research, internal and external forces driving 
CEO compensation were not analyzed. Exploring the role that hiring committees and 
compensation consultants have in CEO compensation could add insights to compensation 
theories (Gupta et al., 2018). A potential avenue for additional research would be to analyze the 
different ways women become CEOs and which promotion path, internal or external, is the most 
efficient and common (Leszczynska & Chandon, 2019). 
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Implications 
Gender and its influence on compensation is a topic that grabs the attention of regulators, 
academics, the government, media, and society at large. The reason for this is that, morally, equal 
work deserves equal pay, regardless of gender. Additionally, companies should want to attract the 
best candidates and paying based on merit rather than gender broadens the pool of applicants. 
The findings show that women who reach the CEO level are compensated not based on gender or 
industry composition but most likely on performance. Women CEOs of publicly-traded United 
States firms do not appear to face gender biases when it comes to pay. This is encouraging news 
for women aspiring to a CEO position and hoping for equitable compensation. This study not 
only contributes to research on CEO compensation, but also a greater understanding of the gender 
pay gap in general. There is mixed and limited research on the CEO gender compensation gap 
compared to the gap in other organizational positions (Mohan, 2014; Wang et al., 2018). For 
example, an abundance of research suggests that minorities, including women, are compensated 
less throughout organizational structures (Bishu & Alkadry, 2017; Buchanan, 1997; Poelmans, 
Greenhaus, & Maestro, 2013; Stamarski, Hing, & Leanne, 2015). This current study improves 
our understanding of the gender compensation gap and the boundary conditions of it. The 
findings go against the common wisdom that men earn substantially more than women working 
in the same position with similar qualifications (Abraham, 2017). It contradicts the persistent and 
universal concern of a gender compensation gap (Lips, 2013) and highlights the circumstances in 
which there may be equal compensation between genders (Gupta et al., 2018). The commercial 
and economic implications of this research are important because it implies that gender 
discrimination in compensation, in large United States companies, may have been overcome at 
the CEO level (Leszczynska & Chandon, 2019). Furthermore, pay equality at the CEO level may 
have a positive spillover effect on other organizational levels and society in general (Wang et al., 
2018).  
Conclusion 
 Intense conversations surrounding the gender pay gap happen in both academic and 
everyday life (Gupta et al., 2018). This research suggests that there may not be a meaningful 
difference between the compensation of men and women CEOs, at least in publicly traded United 
States companies. The finding that CEO compensation is not influenced by gender or industry 
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composition but, rather, by the firm’s and CEO’s performance is interesting, especially when 
considering the research, policies, and advocacy towards pay equality between genders. Although 
there are few women CEOs, hopefully, this finding will encourage women aspiring to top-level 
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Means and Standard Deviations of CEO Total Compensation broken down by Gender and 
Industry Composition  
 Gender  
 Men Women Total 
 N M SD N M SD N M SD 
Male-Dominated 
Industry 
2579 7394.11 6709.80 158 7976.93 6492.62 2737 7427.76 6697.68 
Female-Dominated 
Industry 
516 8617.59 6405.13 24 4205.58 2550.82 540 8421.50 6348.61 
Total 3095 7598.09 6674.56 182 7479.61 6247.29 3277 7591.51 6650.70 


















Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among Variables 
  N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Stock return 3267 1.14 4.94     
 
     
2. CEO chairman 3273 0.55 0.50 .01          
3. Tenure  3277 10.26 7.28 .05** .27**         
4.Growth options 3186 -0.44 0.39 .04* -.03† -.02        
5. Firm size 3186 8.51 1.85 -.08** .23** -.14** .07**       
6. Sales 3186 7.87 2.20 -.07** .15** -.13** -.18** .48**      
7. Firm risk 3189 0.73 4.58 .11** -.02 .03† .06** -.03 -.02     
8.Total 
compensation 
3277 7591.51 6650.70 -.06** .21** -.09** -.17** .73** .52** -.06**    
9. Gender 3277 0.06 0.23 -.00 -.03† -.08** -.01 .01 .05** -.02 -.02   
10.Industry 
composition 
3277 0.16 0.37 -.02 .07** .15** .11** .18** -.21** -.02 .07** -.02  








Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results 
 Null model Hypothesized model 
 Est. (SE) t Est. (SE) t 
Model for intercept (π0)     
  Intercept (β00) 8.54 (.04) 214.08** -17 (8.48) -2* 
  Industry composition (β01)   -.08 (.07) -1.11 
Model for year slope (π1)     
  Intercept (β10)   .01 (.00) 3.02** 
Model for stock return slope (π2)     
  Intercept (β20)   .00 (.00) 0.95 
Model for CEO chairman slope (π3)     
  Intercept (β30)   .07 (.03) 2.03* 
Model for tenure slope (π4)     
  Intercept (β40)   .00 (.00) .95 
Model for gender slope (π5)     
  Intercept (β50)   -.04 (.06) -.64 
  Industry composition (β51)   .09 (.16) .56 
Model for firm risk slope (π6)     
  Intercept (β60)   -.00 (.00) -4.39** 
Model for growth options slope (π7)    
  Intercept (β70)   -.36 (.04) -8.31** 
Model for firm size slope (π8)     
  Intercept (β80)   .34 (.01) 23.46** 
Model for sales slope (π9)     
  Intercept (β90)   .02 (.01) 2.07* 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 Variance Parameters 
 Null model Hypothesized model 
Level 2 variance (r0) .68** .19**   
Level 1 variance (e) .16 .15 
Gender slope variance (r5)  .04 
Variance explained at Level 2 80.71% 71.95% 
Variance explained at Level 1 19.29% 10.81% 
Note. N = 3277 (initial); after run-time deletion, N(level-1) = 3277 (null model), 3174 
(hypothesized model), N(level-2) = 441; Est = Estimate; SE = Standard Error (robust standard 
errors). *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 
 
